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In The Onion's version of George W. Bush's inauguration speech,
Bush intones: "Our long national nightmare of peace and prosperity is
finally over."' Written on January 17, 2001, the satire is so prescient that
it merits quotation at length, and thus appears below (what are footnotes
for, after all?).2 By the end of his two terms in office, Bush had not only
wrecked the nation, but also wrecked the model of government that had
dominated national politics for twenty-eight years. The purpose of this
essay is to explore the possibility that the Obama Administration will
develop a new model, a new approach to governing America. It focuses
exclusively on regulatory policy, and uses the regulation of financial
derivatives as its example. The essay proceeds as follows: Part I dis-
cusses models of governance generally (Section A) and their application
* University Professor of Law and Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
1. Bush: "Our Long National Nightmare of Peace and Prosperity Is Finally Over," THE
ONION (Jan. 17, 2001), http://www.theonion.com/articles/bush-our-long-national-nightmare-of-
peace-and-pros,464/.
2. Bush swore to do "everything in [his] power" to undo the damage wrought by
Clinton's two terms in office, including . . . going into massive debt to develop
expensive and impractical weapons technologies . . . . Bush also promised to bring
an end to the severe war drought that plagued the nation under Clinton, assuring
citizens that the U.S. will engage in at least one Gulf War-level armed conflict in the
next four years.....
On the economic side, Bush vowed to bring back economic stagnation by
implementing substantial tax cuts, which would lead to a recession ....
Turning to the subject of the environment, Bush said he will do whatever it takes to
undo the tremendous damage not done by the Clinton Administration to the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge. He assured citizens that he will follow through on his
campaign promise to open the 1.5 million acre refuge's coastal plain to oil drilling.
Id.
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to the regulatory process (Section B). Part II explores a new approach to
governance descriptively, if unimaginatively, named New Public Gov-
ernance (Section A), that might serve as a model for the Obama Admin-
istration, and describes the way that approach applies to regulatory
policy (Section B). Part III uses the example of the 2007-08 financial
crisis, in particular the case of mortgage-backed securities, to assess the
causes of the crisis (Section A) and the cures that the New Public Gov-
ernance suggests (Section B).
I. MODELS OF POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN
A. Politics: Skowronek's Theory of Presidential Leadership
Stephen Skowronek's theory of presidential leadership provides a
framework that can be used to understand models of governance in gen-
eral, and of the regulatory policy that constitutes such an important part
of modern government.' This will in turn provide insight into the mean-
ing of Barak Obama's election and the possibility that his administration
will develop a new approach to governance and regulation.
Skowronek begins from the somewhat counterintuitive position that
the president's greatest power resides in negation rather than creation.
As the leader of a government with divided powers and of a nation with
a robust, pluralist and interventionist public discourse, he generally can-
not take control of affairs and systematically implement his ideological
vision. What he can do is change direction, altering what has gone
before. The presidency, Skowronek writes, "has functioned best when it
has been directed toward dislodging established elites, destroying the
institutional arrangements that support them, and clearing the way for
something entirely new."4
The principal determinant of a president's ability to achieve some-
thing new by using this "battering ram"' is, according to Skowronek, his
position in history. Skowronek divides American presidents into three
categories, which he labels reconstructive, articulating and disjunctive.
Reconstructive presidents take office as opponents of previously estab-
lished regimes that have "become vulnerable to direct repudiation as
failed or irrelevant responses to the problems of the day."6 As a result,
they have the unusual opportunity to "reformulate the nation's political
agenda altogether, to galvanize support for the release of governmental
3. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITics PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS
To GEORGE BUSH (1993).
4. Id. at 27.
5. Id. at 28.
6. Id. at 36; see generally id. at 36-39.
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power on new terms, and to move the nation past the old problems,
eyeing a different set of possibilities altogether."' Skowronek's recon-
structive presidents have come down to us with the reputation of being
great leaders: Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt.8
Skowronek's second category consists of presidents who come to
power when the regime established by a prior reconstruction remains
relevant and resilient, and who strive "to fit the existing parts of the
regime together in a new and more relevant way."9 "[T]hese presidents
shake things up largely by blasting away at the obstacles to completing
the work and exhorting their followers to continue the fight."10 Most
obviously, this group includes direct followers of a reconstructive presi-
dent who are close colleagues of that president and are specifically
elected as his successor: Madison, Van Buren, and Truman.' It also
includes presidents who follow the reconstructive president after a
period of time, but remain committed to the same values and con-
sciously identify themselves as such, regardless of any direct personal
connection. Skowronek provides an extended discussion of four such
presidents-Monroe, Polk, Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon John-
son l-whom he calls orthodox innovators.
Disjunctive presidents are those who are "affiliated with a set of
established commitments that have in the course of events been called
into question as failed or irrelevant responses to the problems of the
day."" They are not necessarily "do-nothing" leaders, as their historical
reputations sometimes suggest; rather, their efforts possess a desperate
quality as they struggle to meet contemporary demands with an
approach that only alienates their followers, while energizing their oppo-
nents. Skowronek considers four such presidents at length: John Quincy
Adams, Pierce, Hoover and Carter.14 A significant feature of disjunctive
presidencies, as this list indicates, is that they prepare the way for a new
7. Id. at 38.
8. Id. at 36; see id. at 62-85 (Skowronek does not discuss Washington, who is in some sense
sui generis, but it would not be difficult to view him as the ultimate reconstructive President,
coming to power after the Articles of Confederation government that was widely believed to be a
failure in its entirety).
9. Id. at 41; see generally id. at 41-43.
10. Id. at 42.
11. Thus, each of the reconstructive presidents was followed by an articulating president, with
the exception of Lincoln, whose successor, Andrew Johnson, was actually a member of the
opposing party, chosen because of the secession crisis. Lincoln's real successor was Grant; he was
certainly an articulating president although, like Van Buren, not a particularly good one.
12. Id. at 86-109, 155-76, 228-59, 325-60. These are clearly among the most successful
presidents in this category.
13. Id. at 39; see generally id. at 39-41.
14. Id. at 110-27, 177-96, 260-86, 361-406.
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reconstruction.'
Among the interesting aspects of Skowronek's theory is that it
replaces the linear approach typical of Western historical accounts with
a cyclical account more typical of Chinese historiography.' 6 Presidents
are grouped in patterns that resemble Chinese dynasties, each one with
its vigorous youth, its stable maturity, and its decrepit old age after
which it is swept a way by a new, invigorating successor.17 Skowronek
does not entirely abandon the linear approach' 8 that characterizes other
accounts of presidential politics, however;' 9 perhaps a better analogy is
to Vico's theory that history moves in a spiral pattern, with each cycle
building on the prior one.20 Even better, although admittedly overused
these days, may be the analogy with Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific
revolutions.2 1 A revolution in scientific thought, according to Kuhn, pro-
duces a new paradigm that then serves as a conceptual structure for sub-
sequent research, which Kuhn describes as normal science. After a
while, however, contradictory data begins to accumulate and the para-
digm is placed under increasing stress as its devotees struggle to accom-
modate this data within the confines of the paradigm. The situation
persists until someone develops a new paradigm that more adequately
explains the data and displaces the preceding one.
A truly convincing model of institutions or human behavior is one
that, like the Chinese model of dynastic cycles, predicts future events.2 2
15. Id. at 40.
16. See EDWIN REISCHAUER & JOHN FAIRBANK, EAST ASIA: THE GREAT TRADITION 111-18
(1960). For modem interpretations, see C.Y. Cyrus & Ronald Lee, Famine, Revolt and the
Dynastic Cycle: Population Dynamics in Historic China, 7 J. POPULATION EcON. 351 (1994); Dan
Usher, The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State, 79 AM EcON. REV. 1031 (1989). This mode
of thought was also common in Ancient Greece. See HESIoD, THEOGONY & WORKS AND DAYS
(M.L. West, trans., 1988).
17. In the Chinese account, each new dynasty is said to possess the Mandate of Heaven,
which it loses as it declines. I will avoid any effort to analogize this aspect of Chinese
historiography to an account of American presidents.
18. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 3, at 52-58, 409-46.
19. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS:
THE PoLIrrcs OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT To REAGAN (Free Press 1990) (1960) (post-World
War II presidency represents a new phase of leadership); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) (linear increase in presidential power).
20. GIAMBATTISTA Vico, THE FIRST NEW SCIENCE (Leon Pompa ed., trans., 2002); see
BENEDETTO CROCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO 131-32 (R. G. Collingwood trans.,
Transaction Publishers 2002) (1913).
21. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONs (2d ed. 1970); see also
IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES (John Worrall &
Gregory Currie eds., 1978).
22. As Reischauer and Fairbank report, see supra note 16, the model was developed during
the Han Dynasty on the basis of prior regimes that were largely mythological in nature. A period
of warring states that did not conform to the model followed, and the next dynasty did not arise for
another four hundred years. After that, however, came 1300 years of Chinese history that largely
360 [Vol. 65:357
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Skowronek ends his book with a preliminary discussion of Reagan and
George Bush (henceforth "Bush P'). 2 3 Nearly twenty years later, and
thirty years after Carter's defeat, it is apparent that the intervening
period follows his model quite well. Reagan represented a reconstruc-
tion, a reformulation of the nation's policy agenda and a repudiation of
many of the policies and politics that had dominated the nation, despite
Republican interludes, for nearly fifty years. Bush I was an articulation
of Reagan's policies, a loyal former colleague who followed him-very
much in the mode of Madison, Van Buren and Truman-and strove to
adapt his policies and perspectives to a changing situation. George W.
Bush (henceforth "Bush II") clearly represented a disjunction, an effort
to continue or revive the same policies after they had ceased to be rele-
vant to contemporary conditions or appealing to their former supporters.
The result was a series of severe or catastrophic failures, spanning a
wide range of policy areas: foreign affairs, the economy, disaster relief,
environmental protection and human rights.24
B. Regulatory Policy
Skowronek's theory focuses on political leadership and electoral
success, those being the metrics by which he determines whether a presi-
dent is reconstructive, articulating or disjunctive, but it can be readily
adapted to modes of governance, which are intimately related to politics.
The topic of this essay is regulatory policy, a crucial component of gov-
ernance in a modem administrative state. It was certainly crucial to
Franklin Roosevelt's reconstruction, which centered on the idea that
government could take an active role in solving people's economic
woes. Roosevelt's first attempt to do so, subsequently known as the First
New Deal, was the National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA).25 The
NRA adopted a corporatist strategy, under which the Administration
conformed to that model, with the T'ang, Sung, Ming, and Ch'ing Dynasties following the pattern
that the Han historians had articulated. The so-called Yuan Dynasty, between the Sung and the
Ming, was in fact the Mongols, and was possibly an exception to the pattern.
23, See SKOWRONEK, supra note 3, at 409-46.
24. For general assessments of the Bush II presidency, see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); Scorr
MCCLELLAN, WHAT HAPPENED: INSIDE THE BUSH WHITE HOUSE AND WASHINGTON'S CULTURE
OF DECEPTION (2008); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); CRAIG UNGER, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE
OF BUSH (2007); JACOB WEISBERG, THE BUSH TRAGEDY (2008); BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR
(2003); BoB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATACK (2004); BOB WOODWARD, STATE OF DENIAL (2006).
Not every account of George W. Bush's presidency is negative, however. See GEORGE W. BUSH,
A CHARGE KEPT: THE RECORD OF THE BUSH PRESIDENCY 2001-2009 (Marc A. Thiessen ed.,
2009).
25. For general descriptions, see CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION
OF FREEDOM 285-89, 303-06 (2003); DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW:
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attempted to induce businesses, workers and consumers in each industry
to join together in developing industry codes to control prices and stimu-
late consumption. While the immediate motivation for its passage was to
counteract Senator Hugo Black's proposal for a mandatory thirty-hour
work week,2 6 its more general, albeit vaguer, inspiration probably came
from Mussolini,27 who was much admired at the time.28 Within a few
years, however, the NRA turned out to be unmanageable, Hitler had
given fascism a bad name,29 and the Supreme Court was emboldened to
strike down the entire act as an unconstitutional delegation of power, 30 a
rationale that it had never invoked before and has never invoked since.3 1
Roosevelt, ever the pragmatist, then shifted gears and moved for-
ward with a number of statutes which instituted a more adversarial, com-
mand and control model of regulation that focused on disciplining
corporations for specified misbehavior rather than on efforts to obtain
their cooperation.3 2 That model of regulation, sometimes called the
"Second New Deal," became the standard approach and extensive reli-
ance on it was a hallmark of the Democratic administrations that fol-
A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (1988); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNs,
ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 180-81, 191-93 (1956).
26. BLACK, supra note 25, at 285; SKOWRONEK, supra note 3, at 305-06.
27. See R.J.B. BOSWORTH, MUSSOLINI'S ITALY: LIFE UNDER THE FASCIST DICTATORSHIP
1915-1945 308-12 (2006); ERNST NOLTE, THREE FACES OF FASCISM 261 (Leila Vennewitz trans.,
1965) (1963).
28. BOSWORTH, supra note 27, at 285. Roosevelt corresponded with Mussolini on friendly
terms from the time of his first inauguration until 1936, addressing him as "My Dear Duce."
BLACK, supra note 25, at 273, 423-24.
29. Italy was still an ally of Britain and France in 1932, as it had been in World War I,
BOSWORTH, supra note 27, at 277-306, and Mussolini was neither overtly anti-Semitic, id. at
415-21, nor particularly savage in punishing dissenters, id. at 241-42, until his alliance with
Hitler in the mid-1930s. See also NOLTE, supra note 27, at 228-31. It was this alliance that
generated the first feelings of hostility toward Mussolini in the U.S. BOSWORTH, supra note 27, at
396-414. Both Bosworth and Nolte caution us against adopting too benign a view of Mussolini, a
temptation because of the inevitable comparison with Hitler; but the need for this warning
underscores the rather positive attitude toward Mussolini that prevailed through the early 1930s.
30. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (striking
down the NRA in its entirety on delegation grounds); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430
(1935) (striking down one provision of the NRA on delegation grounds).
31. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (unanimously
reversing a D.C. Circuit decision that struck down EPA regulations on delegation grounds);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989) (upholding broad delegation to U.S.
Sentencing Commission over a single dissent by Justice Scalia); Indus. Union Dep't v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 611, 661-62, 683-89 (1980) (upholding broad delegation to the
Secretary of Labor; the Court was unanimous on the delegation issue, with only Justice Rehnquist
expressing reservations).
32. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940,
163-63 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morriseds.,1963); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 385-442 (1960). Briefer discussion can be
found in BLACK, supra note 25, at 355-57; BURNS, supra note 25, at 223-26; SKOWRONEK, supra
note 3, at 312-13.
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lowed, as well as of the Nixon Administration. The two great bursts of
regulatory activity during this period were in the mid to late 1930s,
when the command and control approach was applied to economic
issues, and in the mid to late 1960s, when it was applied to consumer
issues, environmental issues, and civil rights. As might have been
expected and is now well known, the size of the national government
grew steadily throughout this period.34
The Reagan reconstruction involved a broad attack on the model of
regulation that had prevailed since Franklin Roosevelt. Reagan cam-
paigned in 1980 against the extent of federal regulation and the scope of
the federal government in general. The mood of his campaign was cap-
tured by his subsequent remark that "the nine most terrifying words in
the English language are 'I'm from the government and I'm here to
help.'" 3 This represented a dramatic change; Roosevelt, Truman, Ken-
nedy, Johnson, and Carter all based their campaigns and administrations
on federal initiatives. Eisenhower, as Skowronek notes, "demonstrated
extraordinary sensitivity to the resilience of the previously established
regime . .. [and] refused to take on New Deal liberalism or Fair Deal
foreign policy directly." 36 Nixon was the ultimate Washington insider;
perhaps the only President who had no home state at the time he ran for
office," he signed the far-reaching regulatory statutes written and
passed by a liberal Democratic Congress.38 Reagan's attack on federal
regulation thus represented a genuine reconstruction in Skowronek's
terms.
Once in office, Reagan attempted to advance his reconstruction
along three overlapping lines: deregulation, privatization, and cost-bene-
fit analysis. Deregulation could serve as a general term for Reagan's
entire regulatory policy. If the term is limited to the repeal of regulatory
statutes and the refusal to enact new ones, however, it is distinguishable
from the other two policies and provides more descriptive clarity. Der-
egulation, in this limited sense, was actually an important part of
Carter's administrative program, but it was directed to those industries
33. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189 (1986).
34. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1H 501-06 (2003).
35. Spoken at a press conference in Chicago on Aug. 2, 1986. JULIA VrruLLO-MARTIN & J.
ROBERT MosIGN, THE EXECUTIVE'S BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 130 (1994).
36. SKOWRONEK, supra note 3, at 46.
37. See CONRAD BLACK, RICHARD M. NIXON: A LWE IN FULL 444-507 (2007). Nixon began
as a California politician, and that was certainly his identity when he was elected Vice President in
1952. Id. at 75-267. When he ran for the presidency in 1968, however, he was a New York lawyer
with no particular political base in any state, and he presented himself as someone with extensive
Washington, D.C. experience.
38. Id. at 642-702.
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where regulation was designed to control and limit competition.3 9 Many
economists rejected regulation of this sort as inefficient,4 0 using a mar-
ket failure model of efficiency, which Carter fully understood. Reagan's
notion of deregulation was not program-specific in this way. He wanted
to reduce the general scale of regulation on the theory that any regula-
tion, whether intended to correct a market failure or not, interfered with
the ability of businesses to create wealth and provide employment.4 In
addition, he had both a political and emotional commitment to federal-
ism and private property and saw national regulation as improperly
intruding on their domains.4 2
Privatization is a separate, although obviously related, policy. It
refers to the process by which a formerly public task is contracted to a
private firm; one famous example is the Reagan Administration's LOG-
CAP contract, in force to this day, through which several private compa-
nies have provided a broad range of logistical services to the U.S.
military.43 Unlike deregulation, privatization is not necessarily designed
to end government regulation of a particular area, but rather to shrink the
number of employees and the amount of funds under direct government
control." From an economic point of view, the purpose is to benefit
39. See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 147-206
(1985); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 57-79, 222-99 (1986) (discussing
railroad rate and passenger air travel regulation). Generally, this policy was adopted in order to
achieve either economic planning or non-economic goals. See, e.g., NICK A. KoMONS, BONFIRES
To BEACONS: FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY UNDER THE Am COMMERCE ACT, 1926-1938
91-92 (1978) (airline regulation adopted to encourage passenger air travel).
40. See, e.g., ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OP REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS II 173-220 (1988); GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS
(1967); W. KIp VISCUSI, ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (4th ed. 2005).
41. See Lou CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 736-40 (1991);
STEPHEN F. HAYWARD, THE AGE OF REAGAN: THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION
1980-1989 214-18 (2009).
42. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987); Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R.
554 (1988). Executive orders are a particularly good indication of presidential policy because,
unlike legislation or treaties, the President promulgates them unilaterally.
43. The acronym stands for Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. The services provided
include housing, sanitation, food, recreation and burial services to soldiers, and operations,
information, personnel and maintenance services to the Army as a whole. See Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program, Army Regulation 700-137 (Dec. 16, 1985), available at www.aschq.
army.mil/gc/files/AR700-137.pdf. Four successive LOGCAP contracts have been awarded to
three different contractors, KBR, DynCorp, and Fluor Corporation. See PRATAP CHATTERJEE,
HALLIBURTON's ARMY: HOW A WELL-CONNECTED TEXAS OIL COMPANY REVOLUTIONIZED THE
WAY AMERICA MAKES WAR (2009); Nathan Vardi, DynCorp Takes Afghanistan, FORBES.COM,
July 30, 2009, www.forbes.com/2009/07/30/dyncorp-kbr-afghanistan-business-logistics-dyncorp.
html.
44. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (1989); GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds.,
2009); DANIEL GuTrMAN & BARRY WILLNER, THE SHADOW GOVERNMENT: THE GOVERNMENT'S
MULTI-BILLION-DOLLAR GIVEAWAY OF ITS DECISION-MAKING POWERS TO PRIVATE MANAGEMENT
364 [Vol. 65:357
AMERICAN REGULATORY POLICY
from the presumed efficiency of private entrepreneurs, who generally
function in a competitive environment.4 5 Far from being something new,
privatization is as old as government4 6 and has been extensively utilized
throughout American history. 47 The U.S. government, after all, has
rarely manufactured the many military and civilian products that it uses.
But the Reagan Administration greatly expanded the potential scope of
privatization by issuing a Supplemental Handbook to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget directive, OMB Circular-76 providing guidelines
for privatization4 8 and an Executive Order that created a presumption in
favor of this approach.49
The third element in Reagan's regulatory reconstruction was cost-
benefit analysis, which was also instituted by executive order.50 In
essence, the order required that every executive agency calculate the
monetized costs and benefits of proposed regulations and submit their
calculations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 5 1 A unit
within the OMB would then review the agency calculations and inform
the agency whether it could proceed with the proposed regulation.5 2 The
goal was to determine whether the regulation was economically justi-
fied-that is, whether the measurable benefits that would result from the
regulation exceeded the costs that would be incurred by the government
and imposed on private parties. Being established by executive order,
the scheme could not serve as deregulation per se; that is, it could not
CONSULTANTS, "EXPERTS," AND THINK TANKS (1976); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO
BETTER GOVERNMENT (1987); PAUL VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION
OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2007);
Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalization and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 989 (2005).
45. For an extreme version of this claim, see Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci,
Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424-31 (2003).
46. Feudalism, after all, is a form of privatization. See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY
123-279 (L.A. Manyon trans., 1961); F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM (Philip Grierson, trans., 3d. ed.
1996) (1950).
47. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
48. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR No. A-76
(Revised Supplemental Handbook 1996).
49. Exec. Order No. 12,615, 3 C.F.R. 259 (1987). Section 1(a) instructed each agency head to
"[e]nsure that new Federal Government requirements for commercial activities are provided by
private industry, except where statute or national security requires government performance or
where private industry costs are unreasonable."
50. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981) [hereinafter EO 12,2911.
51. The order excluded rules whose economic impact was less than $100 million per year.
52. That unit is the Office of Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). It was created to implement the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq., and then given authority
over the cost-benefit process by Executive Order 12,615, thus transforming a fairly minor agency
into one of the most important ones in the federal government.
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repeal a congressionally enacted statute." Nor was it closely allied to
privatization; privatization might reduce the cost of the program some-
what, but for cost-benefit purposes, the money paid to a private contrac-
tor counts to the exact same extent as the money directly expended by
the agency.54 Rather, cost-benefit analysis was a separate initiative to
subject the regulatory process to economic discipline." Policy makers
have always understood that they should not spend more money solving
a problem than the problem itself costs, but cost-benefit analysis is a
distinctive approach in that it counts the costs imposed on private firms
by regulation equally with the direct costs of governmental action.
Although much discussed during the 1970s, and adumbrated by several
initiatives during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations, Reagan's
cost-benefit regimes represented a dramatic departure from prior
practice.
Because Reagan's regulatory reconstruction is primarily a model of
governance rather than a political position, it is helpful to add Kuhn's
theory of paradigms to Skowronek's largely political theory of leader-
ship cycles. Of course, Reagan's regulatory policy was motivated by
political considerations, and of course he used it to express his support
for politically charged notions like free enterprise, self-reliance, private
property, and smaller government. 56 But the policy itself lies well below
the public radar screen; it is too technical and recondite to be a factor in
political debate. Instead, it can be viewed as a paradigm for decisions
involving regulation. Its conceptual, as opposed to its political, center is
belief in the efficiency of a competitive market, an idea that is too
abstract to possess much independent political appeal but really gets pro-
fessional economists excited.
The essential claim is that a market where goods and services are
53. For the same reason, the Executive Order does not apply to independent agencies, over
which the President does not exercise direct control. See EO 12,291 § 1(d).
54. In fact, cost-benefit analysis is specifically designed to count private costs equally. One of
its underlying concepts is the regulatory budget, a mode of analysis by which all the costs of a
government program, including costs imposed on or incurred by private parties, are computed
when deciding on the overall size of government. See Jim Tozzi, Towards a Regulatory Budget: A
Working Paper on the Cost of Federal Regulation (Office of Mgmt. & Budget 1979), available at
http://www.thecre.comlombpapers/regbudget.html; B. Ward White, Proposals for a Regulatory
Budget, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 46 (Autumn 1981).
55. For general discussions of cost-benefit analysis, see MATTHEw ADLER & EIc POSNER,
NEw FOUNDATIONS OF COST BENEFrr ANALYSIS (2006); E.J. MisHAN & EusTON QUAH, COST
BENEFIT ANALYSIs (5th ed. 2007); TEVFIK NAS, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992).
56. He also used it, as have all other presidents since its promulgation, as a means of
controlling the administrative apparatus. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARv. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
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voluntarily exchanged is inherently efficient, more so than any alterna-
tive mode of governing economic activities. From this claim, it follows
that the task of government is to facilitate the market, not to control it or
alter its results. Thus, the government should establish and protect prop-
erty rights and enforce contractual agreements, but it should not under-
take any further regulatory action. If such regulatory action is already
in place, it should be rescinded. The exception, of course, is in a case of
market failure due to monopoly, externality, information asymmetry or
public goods." In that case, regulation has the potential to improve the
efficiency of the market.
There are several caveats to relying on market failure as a rationale
for regulation, however. One is that the government should not conclude
too quickly that a market failure has occurred; in many cases, the market
itself will "clear" the apparent failure." A more important caveat for
present purposes is that the government will not necessarily be able to
correct the market failure because it does not behave in the efficient
manner of a private firm that is subject to competitive market forces. Its
best chance of acting efficiently is to contract out its functions to a pri-
vate firm that is subject to such forces. Thus, the government has a bet-
ter chance of correcting the market failure of public goods by hiring a
private firm to provide services to the national defense forces rather than
providing these services directly. Whether the government subcontracts
out or not, it must take care that its inherent inefficiency does not result
in its doing more harm than good. Cost-benefit analysis is a means of
making this determination. It adopts a skeptical stance toward the gov-
ernment's ability to solve problems; rather than taking the problem itself
as a justification for action, the way the previous New Deal paradigm of
57. The radio legislation that preceded Roosevelt's presidency can be taken as an example of
such governmental action. Individual entrepreneurs who started broadcasting companies-perhaps
the classic image of anti-regulatory Republicans-begged Congress to pass a statute governing
their business, and Coolidge-perhaps the classic image of an anti-regulatory Republican
president-agreed. What they wanted, and what they got, was a statute that established property
rights to specific portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat.
1162, 1166 (1927).
58. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
255-324 (6th ed. 1979); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM (1982); N. GREGORY
MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONoMIcs 201-20, 311-38 (3d ed. 2004); ANTHONY OGUS,
REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1994); DANIEL RUBINFELD & ROBERT
PINDYCK MICROECONoMIcs 327-52, 561-619 (7th ed. 2008).
59. The presence of only one seller does not necessarily indicate that a monopoly exists
because the market may be readily contestable; that is, barriers of entry may be sufficiently low
that another seller could enter if the existing seller were selling goods above the competitive price.
Externalities can sometimes be bargained away and information asymmetries can be resolved by
the sale of information, such as ratings or consumer guides. Supposedly public goods can often be
priced and sold in a sophisticated market economy.
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regulation did, it requires an affirmative demonstration that the action is
justified in economic terms.
Reagan's model of regulatory governance, consisting of deregula-
tion, privatization, and cost-benefit analysis, was continued by Bush I
with relatively little change. This is hardly surprising and is consistent
with Skowronek's model of political leadership; as Reagan's Vice Presi-
dent and the successor to a reconstructive president, Bush I fits into the
classic mode of an articulating president, like Madison, Van Buren and
Truman. What is perhaps more interesting is that Clinton followed the
same model, with some modification. Skowronek places Clinton in a
fourth category of leadership, which he calls preemptive, for presidents
who are members of a different party from their predecessor, but do not
lead a reconstruction of their own. These are "opposition leaders in resil-
ient regimes. . . . Like all opposition leaders, these presidents have the
freedom of their independence from established commitments, but ...
their repudiative authority is manifestly limited by the political, institu-
tional and ideological supports that the old establishment maintains.60
The term "preemptive" does not seem as intuitively accessible as the
others in his model; in any event, it is a product of the essentially politi-
cal focus of his work.
Focusing on governance instead of politics, and adding Kuhn's
concept of paradigms to Skowronek's concept of leadership cycles,
allows us to interpret Clinton's presidency in a somewhat different light.
His regulatory policy, rather than being regarded as preemptive, can be
seen as normal science-a continuation and elaboration of the paradigm
established by Reagan. Like Reagan, Clinton was generally opposed to
new regulatory initiatives and joined him in championing the value of
the market and the need to relieve businesses of burdensome regulation.
In fact, he reached the Republican nirvana of a balanced federal budget
and actually succeeded in repealing several major federal statutes,
including the Glass-Steagall Act and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children.61 Clinton was not a particular proponent of privatization,
although he left OMB Circular-76 in place, but strongly supported a
related policy that he described as "Reinventing Government." This
involved an effort to alter the behavior of public agencies so that it
resembled the presumed efficiency of private firms, specifically by
60. SKOWRONEK, supra note 3, at 43; see generally id. at 43-45.
61. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (1999) (repealing
the Glass-Steagall Act; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17) (1996) (repealing AFDC). To be sure, AFDC was social regulation, rather
than being the economic regulation that is the focus of this study, but it is a product of the same
Roosevelt governance paradigm and was repealed in favor of the Reaganesque policy of
federalism and state control.
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being cost-conscious, client-centered, freed from unnecessary bureau-
cratic rules, and alert to their employee's incentives.6 2 It is related to
privatization because it acknowledges the inherent inefficiency of gov-
ernment agencies and attempts to counteract it by relying on the private
market, in this case as a model rather than directly. Most notably, per-
haps, Clinton continued the OMB cost-benefit analysis that Reagan had
initiated. He substituted a new Executive Order that made some secon-
dary changes, but left the basic structure of Reagan's approach intact.6 3
Bush II continued the normal science of regulatory policy under the
Reagan paradigm. He too adopted a deregulatory stance, abjuring new
efforts in the social or economic realm and disparaging existing environ-
mental, consumer and safety legislation for its deleterious impact on
American business. One of his first acts upon taking office was to
encourage Congress to rescind the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's ergonomic regulations.' He abandoned the Reinvent-
ing Government initiative, which was ineradicably linked to his electoral
opponent, but pushed privatization hard, issuing a new Circular-76 that
required agencies to open everything they did to competition from pri-
vate firms. The revised Circular provided that unless a specially desig-
nated agency officer could justify to the OMB that the activity in
question was "inherently governmental," the agency had to contract out
the function or demonstrate to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) that the agency could perform the function more cheaply than
the private bidders. 65 Bush II saw no need to revise Clinton's cost-bene-
62. For the underlying idea, see DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING
GOVERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1993)
(stating the views of advisors to the National Performance Review). The basic contours of the
initiative itself are stated in ALBERT GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS, REPORT OF THE NAT'L PERFORMANCE REV.
(1993). Vice President Gore was specifically charged with implementing this initiative.
63. Clinton issued a new Executive Order, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 5173
(Sept. 30, 1993), which revised, and in certain ways softened, EO 12,291 but left the basic
approach intact. The continuity is emphasized by the fact that Bush II retained Clinton's Order,
making only minor alterations. See Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002),
which runs less than two pages. Regarding Clinton's continuation of cost-benefit analysis, see
Kagan, supra note 56.
64. See Rachel Michael, Ergonomics: It's Here to Stay, Despite the OSHA Standard Repeal,
10 ENvTL. QUALYTY. MGT. 57 (2001).
65. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR No. 76-A
(Revised Supplemental Handbook 1996); see Matthew Blum, The Federal Framework for
Competing Commercial Work Between the Public and Private Sectors, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT, supra note 44, at 63. Some of the provisions regarding this process appeared in the
President's Management Agenda of 2001. Id. at 65-67. The phrase "inherently governmental"
appears in CIRCULAR No. 76-A. 76-A defines an inherently government activity as "an activity
that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government
personnel." Id. While the Circular goes on to provide criteria, it never offers a definitive test, so
the categorization is inevitably a matter of judgment.
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fit Executive Order, which followed Reagan's Order so closely, to any
significant extent, simply leaving it in place and making relatively minor
changes.
By the time of Bush U's presidency, however, it had become appar-
ent that the Reagan model of regulation, which seemed so fresh and
invigorating when first introduced, actually achieved very little. While
some important regulatory statutes were repealed, the great majority of
economic, environmental, consumer and civil rights statutes remained in
place. Despite Bush's determined efforts to create a presumption in
favor of privatization, the number of functions that were actually trans-
ferred from agencies to private firms remained quite small.6 6 This is not
to suggest that there was little privatization; in fact there was a massive
amount, but there always has been. The point, rather, is that new con-
tracts were granted, particularly for homeland security and the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, but relatively few existing functions were trans-
ferred away from the government and into private hands. Similarly, the
OMB forestalled relatively few regulations through cost-benefit review.
OMB "return letters" rejecting regulations were more often met by new
submissions with revised cost-benefit calculations, rather than with-
drawal of the regulations, so that the review came to be seen largely as a
demand for additional paperwork. 6 7
This lack of progress in achieving the goals of Reagan's regulatory
agenda can be seen as the sort of contradictory data that signals the
disintegration of a Kuhnian paradigm. By itself, however, it did not
represent a disjunction in Skowronek's terms. The reason that Reagan,
Bush I and, in a slightly different way, Clinton made so little progress in
dismantling the regulatory state was that there was no real popular sup-
port for this strategy, and people were consequently not unhappy about
its meager results. They liked the anti-regulatory rhetoric, but they liked
the regulatory programs as well. Not only did the majority of Americans
want to retain social security, which affects nearly all their lives, but
they also wanted to retain the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which
virtually none of them will ever see.
66. See Blum, supra note 44, at 80-85; Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting
in Context: What Drives It, How To Improve It, in GOVERNMENT BY CoNTRAcr, supra note 44, at
204-07, 214-15.
67. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. Cm. L. Rav. 821, 823 (2003). This is not to say that the OMB has no effect;
in fact it clearly serves as a means of Presidential control. See James Blumstein, Regulatory
Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current
Issues, 51 DuKE L.J. 851 (2001); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV.




Perhaps in frustration over his paradigm's impending demise, Bush
II decided to fulfill it in a different way. If federal programs could not be
eliminated through deregulation, privatization and cost-benefit analysis,
they could be undermined by sabotaging the agencies that carried out
these programs. Bush II accomplished this by appointing people to run
federal agencies who were hostile to the agency's mission, motivated by
political considerations, and technologically incompetent.6 8 They pro-
ceeded in turn to undermine the morale of the civil servants who carried
out agency tasks, re-direct the agency away from its basic goals, and
leave essential operational positions unfilled.6 9 It is possible that Bush,
who was nothing if not ideological and stubborn, genuinely believed that
federal agencies really did not do anything useful. The results included
Abu Ghraib, where unsupervised private contractors tortured Arab pris-
oners; the U.S. Attorney scandal, where federal prosecutors were ille-
gally fired on ideological grounds; the New Orleans flooding in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, where the Federal Emergency Management
Administration functioned at less than third world levels; and the
2007-2008 financial crisis, where exotic financial instruments prolifer-
ated outside regulatory control. These disasters contributed to ensuring
that Bush II's Administration would be a disjunctive one. It would be
hard to think of a clearer case when, to re-quote Skowronek, a president
was "affiliated with a set of established commitments that have in the
course of events been called into question as failed or irrelevant
responses to the problems of the day."
68. Maureen Dowd, Neigh to Cronies, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/
09/10/opinion/l0dowd.html (appointment of an unqualified person, Michael Brown, as head of
FEMA); R. Jeffrey Smith, Political Briefings at Agencies Disclosed: White House Calls Meetings
Lawful, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, www.washingtonpostcom/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/
25/AR2007042503046.html (agency officials briefed on Republican election prospects in
violation of the Hatch Act); Adam Zagorina, Why Were These U.S. Attorneys Fired?, TIME, Mar.
7, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1597085,00.html (dismissal of public
prosecutors for political reasons in violation of federal law).
69. Paul Krugman, All the President's Friends, N. Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.ny
times.com/2005/09/12/opinion/12krugman.htmi (EPA, FDA, Treasury and other agencies being
demoralized, politicized and "hollowed out"); James Parks, Bush Administration Strangling
EEOC-Workers' Best Recourse Against Discrimination, AFL-CIO Now BLOG, June 22, 2006,
http:/Iblog.aflcio.org/2006/06/22/bush-administration-strangling-eeoc-workers'-best-recourse-
against-discrimination; Charlie Savage, Report Examines Civil Rights During Bush Years, N. Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/us/politics/03rights.html (GAO Report
concludes that Bush Administration failed to enforce Civil Rights laws).
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II. NEW PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND ITS APPLICATION
To REGULATORY POLICY
A. The Theory of New Public Governance
The question that arises in the wake of Bush II's disjunction is
whether Obama will be able to achieve a reconstruction. It is probably
too early to tell. But even at this juncture, at least one reconstructive
element is apparent: rejection of the pessimistic stance toward govern-
ment intervention and reinvigoration of the belief that government can
advance the collective goals of our society. This was, of course, an ele-
ment of the Roosevelt reconstruction as well, which suggests a sort of
cyclic historical process. But the process may be better described by
Vico than by the traditional Chinese historians. That is, rather than mere
repetition, any reconstruction is more likely to build upon the
microeconomic insights that served as the basis of the Reagan recon-
struction. We are unlikely to return to the straightforward command and
control model of regulation that characterized the second New Deal. We
have learned too much about the counterproductive effects of that
approach and the inefficiencies that inhere in it. If there is to be a recon-
struction, and one that reinvigorates the role of government, it will need
to be based on a new paradigm of regulation.
One candidate for such a paradigm is New Public Governance. The
Reagan paradigm, composed of deregulation, privatization, and cost-
benefit analysis was at least partially inspired by scholars who had been
working in the microeconomic field for several decades.7 0 Their theories
not only merged these disparate elements into a coherent approach to
governance, but also transformed the apparently selfish desire of busi-
nesses to avoid regulation into a strategy to improve the nation's wel-
fare, thus giving resistance to regulation a legitimacy that moved it from
the squalid back rooms of political intrigue into the sunlit forum of pub-
lic policy. New Public Governance is also the product of scholarship,
and has now been several decades in gestation. It is not limited to
70. For some foundational works, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); MANCUR OLSEN,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(5th ed. 1998).
71. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWArrE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING By THE BOOK:
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998); Grdinne de Bdirca & Joanne Scott,
Narrowing the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 13 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 513, 513-18 (2007); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rev. 297, 297-326 (1999);
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997);
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regulatory policy, but that policy is certainly one of its principal subjects
of inquiry. The question is whether this body of thought can provide a
new regulatory paradigm for Obama's reconstruction of political
leadership.
New Public Governance does not reject the microeconomic theory
of human behavior and market failure that has proven so useful in the
development of microeconomics, and that served as the basis for Rea-
gan's regulatory paradigm, but it locates this theory in a larger institu-
tional and behavioral context. In the modem world, people's desire to
maximize their self-interest often depends on their role in an institution,
rather than their role with respect to the economy in general. That is, the
material self-interest of a manager in the typical business firm will not
be directly governed by the firm's market performance, but by three
other factors. The first, her salary, is often determined by her ability to
carry out assigned functions within the firm that will not be measurable
by the firm's profits because of the specialization of labor that Adam
Smith noted as the starting point of his economic theory.72 Thus, tasks
such as strategic planning, personnel, public or government relations,
and factory or service operations must be evaluated in terms of inter-
nally defined criteria, not firm profits. This will even be true for more
purely economic functions: The task of an industrial firm's real estate
department is not to acquire land most cheaply, but to acquire the land
that will ultimately be most useful to the firm's overall performance. A
second factor that determines managerial self-interest is advancement
within the firm, which will depend even more on institutionally defined
criteria since it will also include collegiality, loyalty, tractability and cre-
ativity. A third factor is advancement outside the firm, which is deter-
mined by fairly specific aspects of human capital such as reputation and
the portability of knowledge. It is increasingly important in this era of
high individual mobility, frequent business recombination, and fluid
make or buy decisions. It remains important even for people with high
levels of firm loyalty, since it feeds back into salary.
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. I
(1995); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004); Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-
thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007); Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 458-568 (2001). For overviews, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004);
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 61 (2009).
72. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
13-30 (R. H. Campbell et al., eds., Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1976) (1790); see also EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocrETY (W.D. Halls trans., 1984) (1917).
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The essence of this important insight goes back at least as far as
Berle and Means' observation that ownership and management are sepa-
rated in the modem corporation. It has spawned a significant economic
literature on so-called agency problems within firms, and constitutes a
major motivation for current executive compensation plans. 74 Nonethe-
less, the general importance of this insight has been somewhat obscured
by the argument, often advanced on the basis of an a priori commitment
to markets, that agency problems can be ignored because competition
will eliminate irrational behavior through a Darwinian extermination of
inefficient firms.75 This substitutes a metaphor for serious analysis. It is
plausible only when small firms that can eliminate such problems are
able to contest a market dominated by large firms, as most modem mar-
kets are. More commonly, all the competing firms will be large, and
agency issues will be endemic. To some extent, transaction cost econo-
mists have been willing to confront this situation,' but the most direct
consideration by economists has occurred within the sub-field of New
Institutional Economics.77 Perhaps more significantly, the study of insti-
tutions and their effects on individual behavior has migrated from eco-
nomics in general to sociology, where modem organization theory tends
to find its methodological home."
73. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (photo. reprint 2002) (1991); see ANDREI SCHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
74. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1959);
LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WImour PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Alfi Kohn, Rethinking Rewards, in HARVARD BUSINESS
REVIEW ON COMPENSATION 51 (Alfred Rappaport & Alfie Kohn, eds., 2002); Alfred Rappaport,
New Thinking on How To Link Executive Pay with Performance, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
ON COMPENSATION 1 (Alfred Rappaport & Alfie Kohn, eds., 2002). This conclusion has not gone
unchallenged; many economists and legal scholars argue that the market for executive
compensation operates with a reasonable level of efficiency. See IRA T. KAY & STEVEN VAN
PUrrEN, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF EXECUTIVE PAY (2007); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142-85 (2005)
(reviewing BEBCHUCK & FRED).
75. See RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE (1992); Armen Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. EcON.
211, 211-21 (1950).
76. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Armen A. Alchian & Susan
Woodward, Reflections on the Theory of the Firm, 143 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 110 (1987).
77. See, e.g, DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (1989); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglass North eds.,1990);
ANDREW SCHOTTER, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTTfUTONS (1981). For a review of the
field, see Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. INST. THEORETICAL EcON.
230 (1986).
78. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, AsYLuMs: ESSAYS ON THE SocAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
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The shift from economics to sociology also allows for the expan-
sion of the microeconomic theory of behavior to incorporate other moti-
vations. Despite the impressive results that the rational actor model has
achieved, most social scientists, particularly those outside the field of
economics, do not accept it as a complete theory of human behavior.
There is simply too much countervailing evidence that people are often
motivated by personal affection, group solidarity, altruism, ideology,
and other drives that cannot be fit within the category of material self-
interest." In addition, there is mounting evidence from psychology that
people do not think rationally, that they are not only subject to
prejudices and preconceptions, but labor under a variety of cognitive
illusions that systematically produce non-optimal results.so New Public
Governance has been open to this evidence, in part because its propo-
nents have no a priori commitment to the rational actor model, in part
because they are willing to draw from social science fields such as soci-
ology where that model has not proven to be persuasive.
B. Application of New Public Governance to Regulatory Policy
The New Public Governance approach to regulation is based on this
more comprehensive theory of behavior. If one believes that individuals
and firms operate exclusively as rational self-interest maximizers, the
natural regulatory approach to adopt is command and control. That is,
the most obvious strategy for altering the behavior of a rationally self-
interested entity is to impose sanctions for the undesired behavior that
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961); JAMEs G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
(1988); JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); JOHN MEYER & W. RICHARD
Scorr, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALTY (updated ed. 1992) (1983);
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991); W. RICHARD Scorr, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND OPEN
SYSTEMS (2d ed. 1987); PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY OF PoLIrrcs
AND ORGANIZATION (Cal. Libr. Reprint Series ed., 1980) (1949); INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS AND
ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS (Lynne G. Zucker, ed. 1988). For a discussion of
the intellectual connections between sociology and contemporary economics, see Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory, in ORGANIZATION THEORY:
FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 207 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995).
79. See, e.g, MAKING PoLTCAL SCIENCE MATTER: DEBATING KNOWLEDGE, RESEARCH &
METHOD (Sanford F. Schram & Brian Caterino eds., 2006); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
(1994). More generally, on the need to move social science away from natural science models, see
BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER: WHY SOCIAL INQUIRY FAILS AND How IT
CAN SUCCEED AGAIN (Steven Sampson trans., 2001); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 2004) (1988).
80. See, e.g., CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic
& Amos Tversky, eds., 1982); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (1992).
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are sufficiently severe so that it is in the self-interest of that entity to
avoid the sanction. This is the traditional model for law, and corresponds
to the positivist conception of law as commands backed by sanctions."
Thus, as Robert Kagan notes, the approach is largely adversarial in
nature, treating the regulated firm as an opponent whose behavior must
be controlled by threat.82
According to New Public Governance, regulators have a wider set
of options. Rather than taking an adversarial stance toward the firm as a
whole, they can, in effect, get inside the regulated firm and craft regula-
tions that operate on the incentive structure of its employees, based on
an understanding of the institutional context of behavior. In addition,
they can appeal to motivations other than material self-interest. New
Public Governance thus suggests a more flexible, cooperative and inter-
active mode of regulatory action. It enables regulators to explore ways in
which they can work together with the regulated party to achieve the
prevailing statute's underlying purposes, rather than adopting an adver-
sarial stance, prohibiting prescribed behavior and threatening punish-
ment for disobedience. By doing so, they can call upon the regulated
party to act in a public-spirited manner, and induce it to do so by engag-
ing in a dialogue that takes its needs and interests into account.
Consider, for example, Jody Freeman's discussion about the way
that public agencies can make use of private standard setting." As she
points out, government has long relied on private standards, sometimes
officially incorporating them into various legal requirements. 84 This
81. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 9-32 (Hackett Publ'g Co. 1998)(1832, 1836); HANS KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 58-64 (Anders Wedberg trans., Russell & Russell, Inc.
1961) (1945); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1967) (1934); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 111-12 (1978).
82. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); see
also Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., Regulatory Encounters: Multinational Corporations
and American Adversarial Legalism, in THE CAL. SERIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SocIETY (Robert
A. Kagan & Malcom Freely eds. 2000).
83. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 638-57
(2004).
84. E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994)); National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1995) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.); Uniform Commercial Code § 4A-501 (2002). See also MALCOLM FEELEY
& EDWARD RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS
REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 103-05, 162-66, 370-72 (1998) (federal judges' use of standards
developed by the American Correctional Association in prisons conditions cases); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative
Reform, 6 YALE J. REG. 1 (1982) (requirement that OSHA adopt private safety standards);
Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005) (role of
private contracts in governance).
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approach is advantageous when compared to external regulations
because it draws upon industry experience and avoids the unintentional
disruption of desirable or benign industry practices that external regula-
tion can impose. The concern, however, is that these rules are developed
without public supervision, through opaque procedures, and under the
control of the industry's dominant firms. According to the Reagan para-
digm, no response to this concern is necessary because private firms are
efficient. According to the Roosevelt paradigm, the proper response may
be to subject private standard setting to uniform procedural requirements
prior to adoption. New Public Governance recommends a more flexible
approach. As Freeman notes, open and inclusive standard setting proce-
dures "might best be encouraged through interaction with agency offi-
cials, and allowed to develop idiosyncratically, depending on the nature
of the standard-setting group, rather than imposed uniformly by Con-
gress."8 5 In other words, the procedures for standard setting and their
ultimate application might be developed cooperatively by the industry
and the agency, relying on industry managers' motivation to act respon-
sibly and on their self-interest in avoiding disruptive rules imposed with-
out regard to industry practice. The cooperative relationship becomes a
source of human capital for managers that they can use to obtain promo-
tions or move elsewhere, thus inducing cooperation on the basis of their
institutionally-generated self-interest.
A second example of the New Public Governance approach to reg-
ulation is Bardach and Kagan's proposal that safety and health inspec-
tors under OSHA can obtain higher levels of compliance by adopting a
cooperative stance toward the regulated parties." Instead of "going by
the book," they can overlook minor violations and address more serious
violations by offering constructive suggestions to facilitate compliance.
Then can then reserve their efforts to impose sanctions for cases where
the regulated party has ignored a direct suggestion from the agency or
engaged in egregious behavior that could not possibly have been
adopted in good faith. Higher levels of compliance can result from this
approach because firm officers who can avoid the imposition of sanc-
tions are likely to advance within the firm, and because their relationship
with the regulator again becomes a form of human capital. In addition,
the firm officers are less likely to disobey federal regulations if they
have established affective ties with the regulators, something an adver-
sarial stance will almost certainly preclude. All of this, moreover, can be
achieved with fewer resources than adversarial enforcement, allowing
more firms to be inspected.
85. Freeman, supra note 83, at 643.
86. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 71, at xvi.
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John Scholz links this approach to the optimal strategy for the pris-
oner's dilemma game." When the game is played only once, there is no
optimal solution, but as Robert Axelrod determined in The Evolution of
Co-operation,88 when it is played repeatedly, between the same partici-
pants and with no definitive end point, an optimal strategy exists, which
Axelrod calls "TIT FOR TAT."8 According to Axelrod, "TIT FOR
TAT is merely the strategy of starting with cooperation, and thereafter
doing what the other player did on the previous move."90 In other words,
the first player begins by cooperating. If the second player continues to
cooperate, the first player does so as well. But if the second player
defects on one turn, the first player defects on the turn immediately fol-
lowing. If the second player then returns to cooperating, the first player
does as well; if the second player defects in retaliation, however, then
the first player continues to defect.91 Thus, the cooperative attitude of
the inspecting agency can be viewed as the optimal strategy to adopt at
the outset, and the imposition of sanctions on firms that disobey cooper-
ative suggestions-"bad apples," in Scholz's terms-can be seen as the
optimal response to a defection.
An interesting feature of both of these examples, and an indication
of the complexity of the New Public Governance approach to regulation,
is that its use of cooperation is both sincere and manipulative or, one
might say, deontological and instrumental. On the one hand, it tries to
foster a spirit of genuine cooperation between the regulatory agency and
the regulated firm so that the two can develop a working relationship
based on trust. To this extent, New Pubic Governance recognizes that
people are often motivated to behave correctly, that they want to obey
the law as long as they can feel that the law is reasonable or, alterna-
tively, as long as the law is not being interpreted so unreasonably that it
provides them with a justification for disobedience. At the same time, as
described above, cooperative behavior is also used instrumentally as a
device to ensure maximum compliance. It can function in this way for at
least two reasons: first, because it is the optimal solution to a two-player,
87. See John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of Regulatory
Enforcement, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 179, 181 (1984); John T. Schloz, Cooperative Regulatory
Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, 85 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 115 (1991);
John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 LAW & POLY 385 (1984).
See also ROBERT KAGAN & JOHN SCHOLZ, THE "CRIMINOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION" AND
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIEs, as reprinted in ENFORCING REGULATION 67 (Keith
Hawkins & John Thomas eds., 1984).
88. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CO-OPERATION (1984).
89. Id at xii.
90. Id.
91. For an expanded discussion of the strategy and its advantages, see AYRES &
BRAffHwArrE, supra note 71, at 19-53.
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indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, and second, because a
cooperative relationship with the regulator constitutes human capital for
corporate executives that will be in their material self-interest to
develop.
One important qualification regarding the application of New Pub-
lic Governance to regulatory policy involves the specificity of goals. A
different line of New Public Governance research has focused on gov-
ernmental programs that are designed to help individuals, particularly
disadvantaged individuals. These include welfare, education, community
development, civil rights, and drug rehabilitation. Scholars who write
about this approach sometimes argue that specific goals and strategies
should be cooperatively developed between the public agency and the
beneficiaries. In other words, the government officials should not simply
assume that they can determine what is best for individuals. 9 2 Regula-
tory policy is somewhat different, however, because, no matter how
cooperative, it is ultimately intended to benefit society in general but not
necessarily the regulated party. Although regulation does provide certain
rewards, it would be unrealistically Panglossian for the agency to try to
tell the regulated firm that "regulation is good for you." In addition,
regulated firms, unlike disadvantaged individuals, are formidable oppo-
nents for a government agency, and need to be treated with some cau-
tion, no matter how positive the cooperative relationship may be. This
suggests that the agency must keep its basic regulatory goals constant,
and restrict its cooperative negotiations to the means by which those
goals are to be achieved.
A regulatory policy based on New Public Governance could serve
as a direct replacement for the deregulation, privatization, and cost-ben-
efit components of the Reagan regulatory paradigm, and one element in
a much-needed Obama Administration reconstruction. With respect to
deregulation, the Reagan paradigm, it will be recalled, was a response to
the adversarial, command and control paradigm that Roosevelt estab-
lished in the Second New Deal. Rather than going back to that paradigm,
New Public Governance suggests a different strategy that avoids the
defects that rendered the Roosevelt paradigm vulnerable and ultimately
led to its disjunction under Carter. In some sense, New Public Govern-
ance returns to the cooperative strategy of the First New Deal, but with-
out the corporatism that seemed so discordant in an American context.
Instead of corporatism, it bases its cooperative strategy on the recently-
92. See, e.g., WILLIAM SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW,
BusINEss AND THE NEW SoCIAL PoLICY 113-42 (2001); Martha Minow, Public and Private
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1242-46 (2002); Sturm,
supra note 71, at 564-66.
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developed understanding of individual motivation and firm behavior.
Rather than placing unrestricted confidence in the public-spiritedness of
regulated firms, or appealing directly to their sense of loyalty, as Musso-
lini did, it uses cooperation as a means of inducing the firm to behave in
the desired way.
New Public Governance also provides an alternative to privatiza-
tion, an aspect of the Reagan paradigm that is already under reconsidera-
tion by the new administration. OMB Circular A-76 was suspended for a
year by the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, which Obama signed
this past March.93 In that same month, he issued a Presidential Memo-
randum instructing the new director of the OMB to re-evaluate govern-
ment outsourcing. 94 Obviously, however, the government's basic
strategy of buying, rather than making, most of the physical products
and many of the services it uses is not going to be changed. This
approach long pre-dates Reagan; in fact, it pre-dates Washington (in
both senses). What will probably be replaced is Bush II's disjunctive
effort to create a presumption of privatization for all governmental func-
tions. The cooperative approach of New Public Governance suggests
that the advantages of privatization-the superior efficiency of private
firms that results from market discipline-can be achieved by the kinds
of arrangements discussed by Jody Freeman and summarized briefly
above. As she points out, it is not necessary to contract out a regulatory
function in order to take advantage of private expertise in standard set-
ting; flexibly designed cooperative relationships will often produce bet-
ter results by combining that expertise with public accountability.95
Finally, with respect to cost-benefit analysis-the third element of
Reagan's reconstruction-New Public Governance also suggests an
alternative approach.96 A much less controversial management tool,
called cost effectiveness analysis, preceded cost benefit analysis. This
approach also monetizes the costs of a government program. The differ-
ence is that it holds the goal constant and does not try to determine
whether that goal is worth the cost involved. It treats goal determination
as a matter of morality, judgment and politics; one way of saying this is
that cost effectiveness analysis treats the evaluation of goals as beyond
93. See Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524. (Mar. 11,
2009).
94. Government Contracting: Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, 74
Fed. Reg. 9755 (Mar. 4, 2009).
95. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
96. Obama immediately reversed Bush H's changes to Exec. Order No. 12,866. See Exec.
Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009). This left the Clinton Order operative in its
original form. Whether the Obama administration makes any changes of its own to Exec. Order
No. 12,866 remains to be seen.
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the pay grade of a policy analyst. The value of cost effectiveness analy-
sis is that it can compare two alternative regulatory strategies to each
other. For example, suppose a hospital needs to decide how to allocate
its resources. The goal of the hospital is a given-to cure as many peo-
ple as possible. Cost effectiveness analysis does not attempt (or one
might say presume) to determine whether curing people is more valuable
than building highways, or, just as an example, bombing and torturing
innocent people to sustain a mission undertaken for false purposes.
Rather, it simply asks which policy alternative will cure the most people
per unit cost. Is it buying more equipment, hiring more personnel, train-
ing the existing personnel, or building new facilities? As can be readily
seen, these are very complex determinations that will involve multiple
factors that will vary over time. Difficult as they are, they do not require
the policy analyst to engage in highly controversial and perhaps impossi-
ble task of monetizing human health.
A regulatory policy shaped by New Public Governance would seem
to have more use for cost effectiveness analysis than cost-benefit analy-
sis. Cost-benefit analysis, because of its many methodological problems
that include the undervaluation of social and moral concerns, has long
been suspected of being a Trojan horse for deregulation." If deregula-
tion is no longer a policy objective, the evaluation of benefits may be
shifted to a different decision making process. Under a New Public Gov-
ernance approach, goals are either set by the public policy making pro-
cess or, in the benefits context, developed by cooperative relationships
between government and intended beneficiaries. Once the goal is estab-
lished, implementation is generally a cooperative process.
Cost effectiveness analysis is more useful than cost-benefit analysis
in this context. Instead of being a presidential tool that little economic
gnomes in the OMB can wield against the regulatory efforts of adminis-
trative agencies, as it was under the Reagan paradigm, it can be a way of
structuring conversations between agencies and regulated parties. Cost-
benefit analysis cannot be used in this way; a conversation about the
value to attach to worker injuries or environmental degradation will so
quickly become intertwined with basic value conflicts that cost-benefit
analysis will provide more irritation than assistance. But a conversation
about the best way to control environmental degradation-the way that
produces a given goal at the lowest cost, all things considered-is one
97. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
To Write a Regulation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1064 (1986); Steven T. Kargman, Note, OMB
Intervention in Agency Rulemaking: The Case for Broadened Record Review, 95 YALE L.J. 1789,
1791-96 (1986).
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that may advance the decision making process along the lines that New
Public Governance recommends.
lII. CAUSES AND CURES OF THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Causes
As an illustration of what a new paradigm of regulation might look
like "on the ground," we can consider a situation that is on everyone's
mind these days-the current financial crisis and the efforts to avoid its
repetition. The particular focus here will be on regulation of over-the-
counter derivatives. These derivatives are widely regarded as at least
partially responsible for the financial catastrophe of 2007-08, one of the
most notable afflictions that Bush II has bequeathed to us.9 8 Title VII of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is
designed to control them.9 9 This statute is over two thousand pages long,
but, as has been widely noted, many of its provisions, including Title
VII, grant broad authority to federal regulators.100 Given this authority
and the importance of the issue it addresses, Title VII of Dodd-Frank is
thus a good place to look for ways in which a new model of governance
might emerge and might contribute to an Obama reconstruction.
A derivative is a security whose value depends on the price of
something else.101 Over the counter means that the security is not traded
on an exchange, but sold directly by the originating institution to inves-
tors. As the Dodd-Frank Act notes, the derivative market has become
enormous; in 2008, the notional amount of outstanding derivatives was
$592 trillion.10 2 The general view is that the over-issue and over-valua-
tion of these securities was a major cause, if not the major cause, of the
98. See generally, GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 2-3
(2010).
99. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. Il l-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. Title VII is designated as The Wall
Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010. See id. at § 701 (Short Title).
100. See, e.g., Susan B. Zaunbrecher & Nathan E. Hagler, Dodd-Frank Reshapes Business,
DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP. PUBLICATIONS (July 15, 2010), http://www.dinslaw.com/dodd-frank_
bill/ ("As many of the Bill's provisions give a basic structure of reform and leave the regulators to
fill in the details over the next 6 to 18 months, the process of implementing the Bill's provisions
promises to be a dynamic one. Consequently, the final shape and practical impact of the Bill are
still years from being understood"); Aline van Duyn & Francesco Guerrera, Dodd-Frank Bill Is no
Glass-Steagall, FINANCIAL TIMEs, June 27, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e355c680-8212-11
df-938f-00l44feabdcO.html ("In the coming months there will be an almighty tussle as regulators
... devise detailed rules to flesh out and back the 2,000 pages of new laws. Those details could
yet determine which groups come out on top, and also the cost of derivatives and investing.").
101. See, e.g., JAMI. BAz & GEORGE CHACKO, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: PRICING,
APPLICATIONS AND MATHEMATICS (2004); ROBERT WHALEY, DERIVATIVES: MARKETS,
VALUATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT (2006).
102. Dodd-Frank, supra note 99.
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financial crisis. One can readily see why; no one really knows how
much these things are worth, and a 10 percent reduction of their value
represents a sum of money roughly equal to the gross domestic product
of Planet Earth.' 03
What caused this mess? The most common answer is "Wall Street,"
a bit of synecdoche that facilitates demonization.Y' When assessing the
derivative crisis from this perspective, the twenty first century denizen
of "Wall Street"-a supercilious, pampered thirty-something, with an
Ivy League education, unbounded self-assurance, and a blistering sense
of entitlement-comes readily to mind. It then seems easy to blame the
financial crisis on excessive cleverness driven by intemperate avarice.
But this instinct, however natural and convenient, should be suppressed.
Greed-driven creativity is the hallmark of our economic system; it is the
force that, as we learned in elementary school (remember Robert Fulton,
Cyrus McCormack, and Thomas Edison?) has catapulted our nation to
its unprecedented level of prosperity.10 5 To treat "Wall Street" as a
whole bushel of bad apples misunderstands the nature of modem social
and political theory, which rejects the pre-modern idea that we can solve
social problems by increasing public virtue. The trick-and it really is a
trick in many ways-is to develop strategies of governance that incorpo-
rate a fully realistic view of human behavior, that neither exalt business
leaders as our elementary school textbooks did or demonize them as did
the undergraduate papers that we wrote in reaction.
One cause of the financial crisis that incorporates what we know
about human nature is the agency problem. Although this is endemic to
all large institutions, as discussed above, it has particular relevance to
the financial intermediaries that spawned the current crisis. Bank lending
officers, for example, are often evaluated according to the number of
loans they generate or the short-term profitability of the loans. The
default rate on their loans is certainly a concern-lenders generally want
their loans repaid-and if a disproportionate number of a lending
103. World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/ (the gross
domestic product of the world in 2008 was $61.1 trillion, in current U.S. dollars). Due to netting,
the notional amount of derivatives is not truly comparable to an economic indicator like domestic
product. Nonetheless, a notional amount of $592 trillion is a lot of money.
104. Interestingly, the official name of the Dodd-Frank Act incorporates this bit of American
slang; it is the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and its Title VII, discussed
below, is the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act. While it might be nice to look
forward to the Madison Avenue Reform Act for advertisers, the Broadway Reform Act for theater
productions, and the Rodeo Drive Reform Act for expensive leisure suits, "Wall Street" does seem
to be a rather informal and perhaps incendiary way to refer to the financial services industry in a
major federal statute.
105. See Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
211, 212 n.2 (2009) ("[B]ecause greed is so ingrained in human nature and so intertwined with
other causes, it adds little insight to view it separately.")
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officer's loans defaulted immediately, that officer would lose his job.
But defaults generally occur many years in the future, particularly on
long-term loans such as home mortgages. That future not only lies
beyond the realistic estimation of the borrowers, who, induced by the
American dream of home ownership, will often be overly optimistic
about their financial prospects, but also beyond the realistic estimation
of the loan officers and their supervisors, who, induced by the more
general American dream of getting promoted, will often be overly opti-
mistic about the repayment capacity of the borrowers. Like people who
live on the slopes of a volcano, 10 6 they will use their experience to mea-
sure ordinary risks, but will tend to discount or ignore the extraordinary
risks that lie beyond their experience and may never occur during their
working lifetime or, at any rate, during the time before they are pro-
moted out of the lending office.
While living obliviously on the slopes of the volcano does not, so
far as we know, increase the likelihood that the volcano will erupt, the
overly sanguine attitudes of bank lending offices contributed signifi-
cantly to the financial volcano of 2007-08. One way they did so was by
issuing increasing numbers of subprime mortgages. In the somewhat
peculiar argot of the finance industry, a subprime mortgage is one whose
interest rate and initiation fees are higher than an ordinary mortgage,
typically because the borrower is less credit worthy.10 7 These mortgages
are the product of deregulation, specifically the Carter deregulation of
interest rates 0 8 and the Reagan deregulation of mortgage terms,1" and
were fueled by changes in the tax laws during the Reagan
administration. 1 o
Attractive though they may have been, subprime mortgages obvi-
ously involve risks, but an apparent means of reducing these risks
106. ROBERT Louis STEVENSON, Aes Triplex, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF ROBERT Louis
STEVENSON 892-93 (Saxe Commins, ed., 1947) ("although few things are spoken of with more
fearful whisperings that this prospect of death, few have less influence on conduct under healthy
circumstances.").
107. See JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER & FRED MAGDOFF, THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 94-97 (2009); see also Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-
Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REV. 31
(2006).
108. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), Pub.
L. No. 94-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)). The
DIDMCA removed federal interest rate restrictions on banks and preempted state laws that
imposed such restrictions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1735(f)(7) (2006).
109. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, Title VIII of the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (2006)).
110. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006)) (phased out the tax deduction for interest payments on
consumer debt but retained it for interest payments on home mortgages).
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emerged during the 1990s with the growth of securitization. To simplify
enormously, a securitized mortgage is a security whose value depends
upon the price of an underlying pool of mortgages; in other words, it is a
derivative."' By putting many different mortgages into the pool and
mixing them around, the risks that might afflict any particular group of
mortgages can be reduced. For example, a lender located in Louisiana,
whose borrower population consists largely of people who make their
livelihood from fishing, might suffer major losses if there just happened
to be a downturn in the local fishing economy. Mixing that lender's
loans with loans from Houston, London, and Abu Dhabi will diversify
away the area-specific risk.112 The security thus becomes an attractive
investment. At the same time, the originating lender is able to reduce its
risk by getting its housing loans "off its books," in the sense that the
purchasers of the mortgage-backed security receive the benefit of the
borrowers' interest payments and take the risk of their default. The
lender still makes money from the initiation fees, which typically
involve zero risk because they are paid up front; moreover, these fees
and are higher than usual for sub-prime loans.
This seems like a happy situation, but the amplification of agency
problems jumps right out. The lender's incentive to make sure that the
loans will be repaid is much reduced because it will no longer own the
loan or the interest payment stream. The financial intermediary that cre-
ates the mortgage-backed derivative is in a similar position because it
makes its money on the sale and will not own the loan and its interest
stream either. The purchasers of the security care about repayment, but
they are induced to buy the security by the attractive return that sub-
prime mortgages can support, and they typically have very little knowl-
edge about the specific risks of the underlying mortgages that were
responsible for these attractive returns. Instead, they rely on rating agen-
111. FRANK J. FABOZZI, ANAND K. BHATTACHARYA & WILLIAM S. BERLINER, MORTGAGE
BACKED SECURITIES: PRODUCTS, STRUCTURING AND ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES (2007); JANET M.
TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS AND STRUCTURED FINANCE: NEw
DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 14-15 (2003); Lakhbir Hayre, A
Concise Guide to Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs), in SALOMON SMrrH BARNEY GUIDE TO
MORTGAGE-BACKED AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 9-68 (Lakhibir Hayre ed., 2001); DOUGLAS
J. LUCAS, LAURIE S. GOODMAN & FRANK J. FABOZZ[, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS:
STRUCTURES AND ANALYSIS 103-25 (2d ed. 2006); R. Russell Hurst, Securities Backed by Closed-
End Equity Loans, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURIIES 281 (Frank J. Fabozzi
ed., 5th ed., 2001); Linda Lowell, Mortgage Pass-Through Securities, in THE HANDBOOK OF
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 25-50 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 5th ed. 2001).
112. Further diversification is achieved by mixing sub-prime mortgages with prime mortgages.
This decreases risk that results from local or temporary downturns, but may increase the risk of
system-wide downturn. Between 2000 and 2005, the amount of subprime mortgages embedded in
mortgage-backed securities increased from $56 billion to $508 billion. FOSTER & MAGDOFF, supra
note 107, at 96.
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cies, which have just as little specific knowledge, and also on economic
models. More importantly, neither the investors nor the rating agency
has the ability to monitor and discipline the process by which the origi-
nal lender generates the loan." 3 Securitization, like traditional securities
and public ownership, separates ownership from operations. It is a pow-
erful financing mechanism, but it severs the motivational links that are
regarded as responsible for the efficiency of the market.
Sub-prime mortgage securities are only one type of derivative.
There are innumerable others, including interest rate swaps, credit
default swaps, currency swaps, commodity swaps, currency futures,
bond futures, commodity futures, and swaptions. The luxuriant prolifer-
ation of these financial exotica is hardly surprising. There is a great deal
of money to be made in the financial sector-perhaps too much relative
to the economy as a whole-and opportunities of this sort will naturally
attract bright people into the business. Bright people tend to come up
with bright ideas, in this case, increasingly sophisticated ways to divide
up potential income and risk, thereby attracting investment from people
with different preferences and expectations. One example of such crea-
tivity is the credit default swap." 4 In an ordinary sale of a mortgage-
backed security, no one benefits if the borrower defaults on the mort-
gage. The borrower loses the existing equity on the home and the inves-
tor loses the expected interest stream. In a credit default swap involving
mortgage-backed securities," 5 one party, called the protection seller,
assumes the risk that the security's underlying mortgages will default in
exchange for periodic payments from the protection buyer. In effect, the
protection buyer is "short" on the underlying mortgage; if the mortgage
defaults, the buyer receives payment of the security's par value from the
seller in exchange for delivery of the now discounted or worthless secur-
ity.116 The instrument thus allows an investor to benefit from an event
that previously represented a loss to both parties, thereby attracting
investors with a different view of the future.
113. Similarly, a bank's depositors are unlikely to be effective monitors. See generally
MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET & JEAN TIROLE, BALANCING THE BANKS:
GLOBAL LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Keith Tribe trans., ed.) (2010).
114. See generally ANTuLio BoMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RELATED
INSTRUMENTs 67-82 (2005); GEORGE CHACKo, ANDERS SJOMAN, HIDETO MOTOHASHI & VINCENT
DESSAIN, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: A PRIMER ON CREDIT RISK, MODELING AND INSTRUMENTs 147-90
(2006); TAVAKOLI, supra note 111, at 45-8 1.
115. This is merely a simplified example. Most credit default swaps do not involve mortgage-
backed securities, but other underlyings such as portfolios, total returns, bond options, and so
forth. See BoMFIM, supra note 114.
116. Note once more the somewhat contradictory terminology of finance. If there is a default,
the protection buyer will, in effect, sell the security to the protection seller for its par value. Thus,
the security moves in the opposite direction from the terminology, which is based on the direction
that the "protection" moves.
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In a recent article, Steven Schwarcz attributes the financial crisis of
2007-08 to the complexity of these instruments and the resulting market
failures.' 17 According to Schwarcz, market failures can result from the
complexities of the underlying assets, the complexities of the securities
themselves, and the complexities of the markets for these securities."
With respect to the complexity of the securities, for example, Schwarcz
notes that "[e]ven if all information about a complex structure is dis-
closed, complexity increases the amount of information that must be
analyzed in order to value the investment with a degree of certainty."" 9
Confronted with prospectuses hundreds of pages long, investors regu-
larly resorted to heuristics such as credit ratings. 120 Complexity may
undermine diversification by obscuring the correlations among appar-
ently diverse assets.121 For example, a security that mixes the income
stream from home mortgages in coastal Louisiana, Houston, London,
and Abu Dhabi might not be as diverse as it appears if the downturn in
the Louisiana fishing industry is the result of an oil spill that threatens
the profits of the entire petroleum industry. A credit default swap involv-
ing such securities will be even more difficult to assess.
B. Cures
An appropriate reaction to the financial crisis is the rejection of the
Reagan paradigm of regulation, and this was indeed part of the reason
for Bush II's disjunction. Deregulation of mortgage rates and terms
encouraged the proliferation of subprime mortgages, and failure to regu-
late derivatives encouraged the proliferation of mortgage-backed securi-
ties and other complex derivatives whose over-valuation then led to the
crisis. Any linkage to other aspects of the Reagan paradigm are specula-
tive. However, one might imagine that a proposal for a government rat-
ing system of securities would have been met by the Bush
Administration's confidence that private rating agencies were more effi-
cient, while a proposal to impose new regulations would have been vul-
nerable to OMB cost-benefit analysis that did not take a catastrophic,
comprehensive decline in derivative values into account.
But a return to the Roosevelt paradigm of command and control
regulation, however tempting, may not be appropriate at all. First, that
117. Schwarcz, supra note 105, at 216-35.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 221 (footnotes omitted); see also Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The
Causes of Information Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J.
1457 (1993); Steven Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REv.
1109 (2008).
120. Schwarcz, supra note 105, at 222.
121. Id. at 223-24.
2011] 387
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
paradigm was not particularly effective at combating agency problems,
which, as suggested above, was one major cause of the crisis. Command
and control imposes sanctions on the regulated party as an entity, being
modeled on the traditional prohibitions that governments impose on
individuals. It does not effectively get "inside" the regulated party to
adjust its internal incentive structure. To say that a firm subject to sanc-
tions will adjust its own incentive structure because it must function in a
competitive market assumes the same Darwinian mechanism that free
market advocates espouse, with even less justification.122 Moreover, the
response to a sanction will be affected, and probably blunted, by the
same agency problems.
Second, the command and control paradigm does not appear to be
an effective way of dealing with complexity. It would be possible, of
course, to simply forbid the use of certain instruments or certain provi-
sions that appear in various instruments. This may well be a good way to
eliminate clauses that create specific, identifiable abuses.' 23 But more
general prohibitions would hobble the finance system that is an increas-
ingly important sector of the U.S. economy, and would place us at a
disadvantage in the fast-moving global economy of the twenty-first cen-
tury.'2 4 The bright ideas of the bright people in American finance are no
less admirable than the innovations and inventors that we read about in
elementary school. The fact that the new discoveries emerge from an
invisible world of computer programs and contingent obligations, rather
than from clanging garages or equipment-filled laboratories, reflects the
incorporeality of the modern economy, not some moral defect of its
inhabitants. Without resorting to inappropriately bucolic clich6s about
golden eggs and gooses, we can say that heavy-handed regulation risks
stifling the entrepreneurial creativity upon which much of our prosperity
depends.
In addition, command and control regulation may have paradoxical
effects in the interconnected, finely-tuned world of modern finance. An
investor, like Rodgers and Barer's princess, is a "delicate thing";125 reg-
122. If that mechanism worked, why would there be a need for regulation in the first place?
123. For example, the federal agency that buys home loans for securitization place limits on
the prepayments terms in subprime loans. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac) will not buy mortgages that impose prepayment penalties more than three years
after initiation. Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 107, at 52.
124. See Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial
Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTrfUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY
CHALLENGES 101 (Yasayuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007).
125. "A princess is a delicate thing
Delicate and dainty as a dragonfly's wing
You can recognize a lady by her elegant air
But a genuine princess is exceedingly rare."
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ulatory controls can undermine confidence in the financial system and
send capital fleeing into cash or Japanese government bonds where it
does the American economy no good. Schwarcz gives the example of a
perfectly reasonable requirement that investments such as mortgage-
backed securities should be "mark[ed] to market."1 26 If these securities
are used as collateral for a margin account, however, a decrease in their
value will trigger a requirement that the investor provide additional col-
lateral. If the investor does so by selling other mortgage-backed securi-
ties, this will further depress the price of these securities, leading to a
further demand for additional collateral and a self-reinforcing downward
spiral. 127
Rather than returning to the Roosevelt command and control model
in response to the disjunction of the Reagan model under Bush II, the
Obama Administration might deal with the financial crisis by employing
the regulatory approach of New Public Governance and thereby contrib-
uting to a reconstruction. Financial regulators could meet with major
investment companies and explore the possibilities of a cooperative,
flexible approach in this arena. The basic idea would be to reach agree-
ments about the sorts of instruments that the institution could offer and
the safeguards that would be attached to each. Instead of attempting to
impose general rules, the process would focus on individualized arrange-
ments that increase safety while leaving room for creativity. Agreement
on the basic goal in this case is relatively easy. The government wants
the financial sector to prosper, not only because it is an important source
of employment and national wealth in itself, but because it is the engine
of the entire American economy. At the same time, no major financial
institution wants, or at least will admit that it wants, to generate or bro-
ker unsafe investments. These attitudes can provide a basis for the kinds
of relationships between regulators and regulated parties that New Pub-
lic Governance recommends.
Negotiated agreements might provide a partial solution to the
agency problem. It is difficult to imagine any general federal law or
regulation that could effectively adjust the incentives of loan officers,
traders, investment analysts, and strategic planners in financial institu-
tions. But these institutions could well agree to redesign their own
incentive structure in return for reduced examinations and other regula-
tory forbearances, as the "TIT for TAT" strategy proposes. 128 Basing
bonuses and rewards on risk assessment as well as sales volume would,
Mary Rodgers & Marshall Barer, Finale, from ONCE UPON A MATERESs (Broadway Opening
1959).
126. Schwarcz, supra note 105, at 233.
127. Id. at 232-33.
128. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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at the very least, sensitize employees to these issues and might generate
more realistic assessments. It might also be possible to make each pro-
motion or bonus dependent upon a review of past as well as recent per-
formance; for example, evaluation of a senior employee being
considered for a promotion might be partially based on how many of the
loans she generated ten years earlier as a junior loan officer went into
default. The amount of job mobility in the financial sector is notorious,
but this mode of evaluation might produce its primary effect on today's
junior loan officers, who would need to anticipate such review, even if
that effect was discounted by the possibility that they would switch
firms in less than ten years. Other promotion and bonus schemes are
possible as well. One goal of a New Public Governance approach would
be to harness the financial sector's creativity for the task of finding new
ways to reduce agency problems. Whatever the incentives might be of
doing so now, they would be greater if rewarded by regulatory
forbearance.
With respect to the complexity problem, a regulatory agency might
require specific permission to issue a new type of security, rather than
establishing legal limits in advance on the types of securities that could
be issued. The permission would be provided through negotiation
between the issuer and the regulatory agency. In the negotiation, the
issuer would need to explain the idea of the security, the risks involved,
the disclosures that it would provide, and the safeguards that it would
put in place. Design of the security might then be seen as a cooperative
process between the issuer and the agency, where the expertise and dif-
ferential incentives of each were joined to produce a product that served
the dual goals of attracting money and avoiding danger. This procedure
would not reduce complexity itself, but might well reduce the market
failures that result from this complexity. It would not be used for estab-
lished types of securities, where experience allows a realistic estimation
of risk, but for new ones whose performance is undetermined. The flexi-
bility of the negotiation process would allow for arrangements where the
conditions for issuing the new security would vary over time as informa-
tion about the security's performance became available.
It cannot be said that Title VII of Dodd-Frank encourages a flexible
approach of this sort. The legislation has the form of traditional com-
mand and control regulation, authorizing the relevant federal agencies to
issue regulations designed to control what is clearly viewed as an indus-
try gone wild. Interestingly, however, its specific provisions do not pre-
clude such an approach. While a detailed analysis of Dodd-Frank, or
even of Title VII, would require much more space than this entire Essay,
one example from its voluminous provisions might be illustrative. Sec-
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tion 716(j) prohibits banks and bank holding companies from engaging
in swaps, including credit default swaps, unless the institution "conducts
its swap or security-based swap activity in compliance with such mini-
mum standards set by its prudential regulator as are reasonably calcu-
lated to pertit the swaps entity to conduct its swap or security-based
swap activities in a safe and sound matter and mitigate systemic risk."l 29
This is followed by a list of the factors that the regulator should consider
in setting these minimum standards, including the expertise and financial
strength of the swaps entity, its "systems for identifying, measuring and
controlling risks," and participation in new and existing markets.130
The list of considerations is introduced by the words: "In prescrib-
ing rules, the prudential regulator for a swaps entity shall con-
sider. "131 It would appear, then, that the statute contemplates the
promulgation of uniform, law-like rules to enforce the prohibition of the
previous sub-section. The standard procedure for promulgating such
rules is for the regulator to publish a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking"
and then elicit comments from interested parties. 132 Although the Notice
sounds like it would be a sort of announcement that the agency was
planning to develop a rule on a specified topic, it is usually a draft rule
in semi-final form, which means that the comments come rather late in
the process. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act provides an alternative
approach;1 33 it establishes a procedure under which the agency can con-
vene a group of interested parties to design the rule in advance of the
required Notice. This procedure clearly reflects the ideas of New Public
Governance,13 but its value is a matter of controversy. 13 An alternative
might be for the agency to encourage various banking associations to
develop rules binding their members, and then draw upon those rules in
issuing its own.
Alternatively, the regulators might negotiate with banks individu-
ally before authorizing new or potentially risky swaps. These negotia-
tions might produce agreements about the institution's internal structure,
129. Dodd-Frank, supra note 99.
130. Id. § 716(k).
131. Id.
132. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
133. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2006).
134. See Freeman, supra note 83, at 653-57.
135. For criticisms, see generally Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking 46 DuKE L.J. 1255 (1997); William Funk, When Smoke
Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Wooffstove Standards,
18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987); James Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation
for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997). Some of the defects that
the critics have found in the process might be mediated if negotiation and cooperation were more
central to the government's general regulatory approach.
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compensation and promotion scheme, risk assessment, or self-imposed
limitations that would be unwise to promulgate as general rules. The rule
adopted by the agency might then allow for such negotiated agreements
as exceptions to its mandatory provisions; that is, the rule could state
that it applies to any bank that has not entered into an individualized
agreement. A more subtle approach would be to promulgate a rule that
established guidelines for such individualized negotiations, and then
require an agreement before the bank could enter the swap market.
An approach of this sort might potentially run afoul of a separate
section of Title VII that requires that the regulators "treat functionally or
economically similar products or entities . . . in a similar manner." But
the language adds the caveat that "[n]othing in this subtitle requires the
[regulators] to adopt joint rules or orders that treat functionally or eco-
nomically similar products or entities . . . in an identical manner.""' The
word "similar" carries almost all the weight of this provision. While it
would be possible to argue that individualized agreements were not
"similar" treatment, the better interpretation, given what we know about
the variability of organizations, is that the degree of similarity would be
sufficient if the individualized agreements were designed to achieve the
same basic purposes, that is, the ones specified in Section 716. In fact,
treating different organizations in different ways that achieve the same
purposes might be more "similar" treatment than imposing a uniform
rule on all of them. In any event, the individualized approach, employing
the more flexible strategies of New Public Governance, would almost
certainly be permitted under the Chevron doctrine. 13 7
IV. CONCLUSION
According to Skowronek, presidential administrations generally
move in cycles, beginning with a reconstruction, followed by one or
several articulations, and ending with an unfortunate disjunction."' Rea-
gan represented a reconstruction, and one of its major elements was a
regulatory policy based on deregulation, privatization and cost-benefit
analysis. Bush I and Clinton were both articulations of that policy, but
by the time of Bush II, it had become a disjunction. The 2007-08 finan-
cial crisis was certainly a major element in that disjunction. Barak
Obama's election signals the possibility of a new reconstruction, one
136. Dodd-Frank, supra note 99, at §§ 712(a)(7)(A)-(B).
137. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
that when Congress assigns implementation of a statute to an agency, that agency has broad
discretion to interpret the statute).
138. See supra Section I.A; Skowronek, supra note 3, at 3-58.
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that might carry us through at least the first part of this rather threatening
century.
A potential basis for a new regulatory policy is provided by the
New Public Governance literature. In contrast to the rational actor the-
ory that lay behind Reagan's regulatory policy, it is based on a model of
human behavior that recognizes institutional dynamics and a wide range
of individual motivations. On this basis, it recommends that we replace
the command and control model that prevailed before Reagan with a
flexible, interactive and cooperative approach. That approach might be
particularly beneficial in dealing with the complex problems and com-
plex institutions involved in the financial industry that produced, and
will ultimately be involved in resolving, the current crisis.
Few people would contest the idea that we must allow the U.S.
financial industry to be creative in dealing with our rapidly changing
world. But our system of government must be equally creative. George
W. Bush has brought us to the point of realizing that we cannot avoid
the need for governmental creativity by abandoning the regulatory pro-
ject of the modern administrative state. Perhaps Barak Obama will pro-
vide the needed creativity that will equip us to deal with this challenging
and changing world as we advance into the millennium that has started
out so badly for us.
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